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ABSTRACT
Power side channel is a very important category of side chan-
nels, which can be exploited to steal confidential information
from a computing system by analyzing its power consump-
tion. In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of var-
ious power side channels on popular mobile devices such
as smartphones. Based on unprivileged power consumption
traces, we present a list of real-world attacks that can be
initiated to identify running apps, infer sensitive UIs, guess
password lengths, and estimate geo-locations. These attack
examples demonstrate that power consumption traces can
be used as a practical side channel to gain various confi-
dential information of mobile apps running on smartphones.
Based on these power side channels, we discuss possible ex-
ploitations and present a general approach to exploit a power
side channel on an Android smartphone, which demonstrates
that power side channels pose imminent threats to the se-
curity and privacy of mobile users. We also discuss possible
countermeasures to mitigate the threats of power side chan-
nels.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—In-
vasive software
General Terms
Measurement, Reliability
Keywords
Mobile security, side channel attack, power side channel
1. INTRODUCTION
Side channel attacks have drawn a lot of research atten-
tion for a long time. Originally, side channel attacks re-
fer to attacks aimed to break a cryptosystem relying on
physical information, which is neither the plain-text nor
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cipher-text. Recently, the context of side channel attacks
has been expanded from cryptosystems to all kinds of com-
puting systems. The goal of side channel attacks is gain-
ing confidential information from the targeted computing
system, while leveraging “side channel” information. Previ-
ously discovered side channels include timing information [5,
13], sound [57, 14], electro-magnetic radiation [44], shared
memory/registers/files between processes [55, 53], sensor in-
formation [43, 41] and power consumption [24, 34], etc.
1.1 Power Side Channels
Power analysis attacks (or power side channels, PSCs)
have become an important type of side channel attacks. The
most famous example of power analysis attacks is the re-
covery of an encryption key from a cryptosystem [24, 23].
Messerges et al.[32] examined both simple power analysis
(SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA) attacks against
the data encryption standard algorithm and managed to
breach the security of smart-cards using signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) based multi-bit attack.
On mobile devices such as smartphones, Michalevsky et al.
proposed PowerSpy [34], which investigates the relationship
between signal strength and the power pattern of smart-
phones. They showed that it is possible to infer smartphone
users’ whereabouts based on the power traces.
Our work also focuses on the mobile platform, but we will
present a more comprehensive study of different PSCs on
mobile devices.
1.2 Attacks on Smartphones
Mobile devices including smartphones and tablets have
become a popular computing platform. Mobile users are
storing more and more privacy information such as pass-
words, credit card numbers, geo-locations, contacts informa-
tion and even biometric information like fingerprints. Un-
fortunately, these sensitive data are vulnerable to various
attacks, as evidenced by a huge number of malware aiming
at stealing user privacy on Android devices [56].
One popular example is UI-based attacks. For example,
ScreenMilker [29] can take screenshots of the foreground app
covertly thus stealing user credentials. Chen et al. proposed
an attack on the Android platform called UI inference at-
tack [12]. They use the shared-memory side channel to infer
UI states, in order to detect the correct timing for attacks.
There are many other attacks on mobile devices, we will
present several of them that can be enabled by exploiting
only power traces of a device.
1.3 Summary and Contributions
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In this paper, we present our study on the existence of
power side channels (PSCs) on mobile devices, which may
bring serious threats to mobile user security and privacy.
We also demonstrate some potential attacks based on these
PSCs.
We conduct our study on PSCs through a series of ex-
periments to collect power patterns of mobile devices. The
power patterns can be collected through both hardware-
based method (with a Monsoon Power Monitor [2] attached
to the smartphone) and software-based method (directly
polling voltage and current readings within the mobile sys-
tem). Then we analyze collected power traces to see if
the uniqueness of different characteristics of the confiden-
tial data can be reflected on power patterns.
With experiments on a Nexus 5 smartphone, we demon-
strate several prominent PSCs on mobile devices that can be
exploited to gain various kinds of confidential information.
Besides previously reported PSCs used to estimate the geo-
location of mobile devices [34], we also identify the following
new PSCs that can be used to: (1) identify different mobile
apps (based on power patterns during app loading); (2) in-
fer different UIs within one mobile app (based on collected
sensitive UI traces); and (3) guess password lengths (based
on power patterns during password input).
Based on these newly discovered PSCs, we discuss possi-
ble exploitations and present a comprehensive exploitation
scenario, in which the malicious party could steal user pass-
words by leveraging PSCs in a particular order. To show how
the exploitation works in reality, we present an overview of a
general approach to exploit PSCs on Android smartphones.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We present the first demonstrative study to reveal the
existence of multiple power side channels on smart-
phones.
• We demonstrate that power side channels pose practi-
cal threats as they can be used to fulfill different attack
purposes, such as app identification, UI identification
or password guessing.
• We present a general approach to exploit power side
channels.
• We discuss possible countermeasure techniques to mit-
igate the threats of power side channels.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first
introduce our methodology in Section 2. In section 3, we
present various power side channels we discover on mobile
devices. Section 4 presents the details of our research on
the exploitation of power side channels. We discuss our lim-
itations and possible defenses and future work in Section
5. Background of our work and survey of related work are
presented in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes this paper.
2. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we introduce the experimental setup and
how we collect power traces from a smartphone.
2.1 Experimental Setup
We use a Google Nexus 5 smartphone to perform most of
the experiments. The power numbers can be measured with
Table 1: Battery status files used in our experiments (on the
Android platform for Nexus 5).
File location Description Unit
/sys/class/power_
supply/battery/
voltage_now
Instant voltage
reading of battery
µV
/sys/class/power_
supply/battery/
current_now
Instant current
reading of battery
µA
a Monsoon Power Monitor with a stable 4.2V voltage. We
install popular apps on Android ASOP 4.4 on the testing
phone and measure the power numbers in different cases.
2.2 Hardware Measurement
Hardware measurement is straightforward. We use the
Monsoon Power Monitor [2] in our study to supply a sta-
ble voltage to smartphones and measure the current value
in various stages. The power monitor works as an accurate
hardware power meter, which offers stabilized power supply
to the smartphone being tested and records the power con-
sumption numbers of the smartphone in real-time. Since the
voltage is a constant, we simply use current value to denote
the power consumption.
2.3 Software Measurement
Although power measurements based on hardware meters
can be used to confirm the existence of PSCs, it might still
not be applicable to real-world exploitation since the hard-
ware meter is apparently not a standard auxiliary accessory
for smartphones.
Fortunately, power related statistics are publicly acces-
sible on most smartphone OSes such as Android. In gen-
eral, instant power numbers can be calculated based on
voltage and current readings of BMU (Battery Monitoring
Unit) [51]. The battery status information is accessible by
most apps without system-level privilege.
In our experiments, we develop a polling collector on a
Nexus 5 smartphone which reads and records power patterns
by polling battery status files, which are listed in Table 1.
2.4 Identification of Power Side Channels
In this paper, a power side channel (PSC) is defined as
an identifiable power pattern that can be used to infer the
secret information from a running app on a mobile device.
We assume that power consumption traces are available as
an unprivileged source that can be obtained by any normal
apps running on a mobile device, which is the case for most
Android devices.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the existence
of PSCs on mobile devices that can be exploited to perform
various attacks. We achieve this by providing experimental
results that show repeatable and unique power traces that
can be detected during runtime. We also cover the details
on how to exploit these PSCs to conduct real attacks. We
believe that these PSCs pose real threats to the security and
privacy of mobile users.
3. POWER SIDE CHANNELS
This section presents our findings on potential power side
channels (PSCs) on mobile devices, especially three new
PSCs that can be exploited to identify running apps, infer
sensitive UIs and guess password information, respectively.
3.1 PSC #1: App Identification
For many real-world attacks aiming at mobile systems,
knowing which app is running in the foreground is impor-
tant. Knowing the identity of the foreground app means be-
ing aware of the timing information of the attacking target.
Previously, identity of the foreground app can be accessed
by calling the getRunningTasks() method of the Activity-
Manager on Android for all apps. However, this method is
officially unavailable to third-party apps after Android 5.0
due to security concerns [1].
Based on our findings, the foreground app can also be
identified by analyzing the power patterns of the app loading
phase. We choose three popular apps from three common
app categories(social media, e-commerce and productivity)
and record the power patterns of the loading phases. The
results are shown in Figure 1. It is obvious that different
apps exhibit distinguishable power patterns and different
test runs of the same app generate visually similar power
curves.
We have conducted more than two dozen different test
runs on these apps to test the repeatability of the power
patterns during app loading. The results show similar pat-
terns as the data shown in Figure 1. However, due to space
limit, we cannot show all the results in this paper.
On the other hand, we have also tested the app to collect
its power pattern when the apps continue to run after the
app loading phase. The results show that the power patterns
during the app loading phase is distinguishable from power
traces in other execution phases.
We also collected power traces during app loading using
the software-based method and got similar results. Because
software-based power traces are more practical for real-world
attacks, we will present only software-based traces in the
next case.
3.2 PSC #2: UI Inference
The UI states within a mobile app are also crucial for
many attacks. For example, in order to initiate activity
hijacking attacks on Android, attackers need to know when
the user login UI will be prompted so that they can intercept
the UI state transitions and insert fake user login UIs that
could steal user credentials.
However, what is going on inside an app is not directly
observable by other parties without system-level privileges if
the app chooses not to share it. A previous study has shown
that attackers could peek into mobile applications via the
shared-memory side channel along with some UI signatures
based on CPU utilization time and other runtime events [12].
Different UI states within one mobile app can also be in-
ferred through their respective power traces. As depicted in
Figure 2, we conduct experiments on collecting power pat-
terns of visiting three different UIs in the Amazon app in
multiple test runs. The power patterns demonstrate both
the repeatability of a single UI and the distinguishability
between different UIs within the same mobile app.
For example, in order to infer the login screen of a mobile
app, an attacker can first collect the power patterns of the
targeted UI in advance on another device. After learning
the power pattern, it is possible to detect the pattern on the
targeted device with a pattern matching algorithm. In this
way, the attacker would be able to infer when the targeted
UI is loaded on the targeted device, i.e., recognizing the
exact timing to conduct attack.
3.3 PSC #3: Password Length Guessing
For a more complex scenario, we attempt to explore whether
power traces can be used to reveal information on user pass-
words, similar to previous power analysis approaches on
other platforms.
Although it is difficult to guess the actual passwords, we
find that it is relatively easy to identify the length of a pass-
word during password input. Figure 3 depicts the hardware-
measured power traces during password input. Each time
the user inputs a single letter of the passwords, it will be
reflected in the power pattern as a sudden “burst” of power
consumption. It is obvious that the length of user’s pass-
word can be inferred by counting the number of consecutive
power pattern “bursts”.
Obtaining the length of a user password is meaningful for
attackers to guess the password since it reduces the com-
plexity of the cracking algorithm, as well as the size of the
helping dictionary.
3.4 PSC #4: Geo-location Estimation
The geo-location of a mobile device can also be revealed
by its power consumption pattern. A recent study uses ma-
chine learning techniques to identify the routes taken by the
smartphone users based on previously collected power con-
sumption data [34].
There are many directions can be followed on this thread
of work. For example, based on our observation, the power
consumption patterns can be used to track the accurate real-
time location of a mobile device, if a database of power pat-
terns on location signatures has been collected in advance.
4. PSC EXPLOITATIONS
In this section we present a detailed description of how to
exploit power side channels (PSCs) on mobile devices. We
first discuss possible exploitations on mobile devices lever-
aging presented PSCs. Then we introduce a general PSC
Exploitation approach.
4.1 Possible PSC Exploitations
PSCs on mobile devices can be exploited by malicious par-
ties to steal user privacy information such as login creden-
tials and geo-locations.
For example, as depicted in Figure 4, PSCs #1, #2 and
#3 found in the previous section can be combined to guess
user login credentials of a certain app. To be more specific,
the attack can first learn the power patterns of the victim
app, the target UI and the user input. Then the attacker
can develop a malicious app to fulfill PSC exploitations. The
malicious app can first detect the loading of the victim app
via PSC #1; then the malicious app can capture the oc-
currence of the login UI via PSC #2; finally the malicious
app can help crack user password with the password length
information acquired via PSC #3. It should be noted that
the malicious app does not need any special permission to
read system power patterns on popular mobile systems like
Android.
The key of the malicious apps to exploit PSCs is to achieve
automated detection of some pre-learned power patterns.
This can be done by adopting pattern matching or machine
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 1: Hardware-based measurements on the loading phases of different apps in two test runs: (a), (d) for WeChat; (b),
(e) for Alipay; (c), (f) for Gmail.
Figure 2: Power traces collected through software-based measurement for the Amazon app. The three UIs shown above are
app entry, product details, and user login, respectively.
learning algorithms, such as dynamic time warping (DTW)
[37], which can be used to match a previously learned pat-
tern in a continuous power trace. However, the pattern
matching process may affect the total system power con-
sumption during detection, thus it should be implemented
as a light-weight detection process if used in real-time.
In the above exploitation scenario, all attacks are based on
PSCs. However, it is not necessary to use the power chan-
nel alone to conduct the attack. Attackers can choose to
combine PSCs with other attacking channels to improve the
Figure 3: Power patterns from hardware measurements when inputting passwords with different lengths.
Figure 4: Possible Exploitations of presented PSCs.
attacking success rates. On particular example is that an
attacker can choose to take screenshots continuously after
detecting the target UI and apply image recognition algo-
rithms to retrieve user passwords in the screenshots. Ap-
parently, screenshot-based attacks are orthogonal to PSC
based attacks we discussed and out of scope of this paper.
4.2 A General Exploitation Approach
Figure 5 shows the overview of a general PSC exploita-
tion approach. The purpose of PSC exploitation is to find
an effective method to detect the occurrences of the target
power pattern from a continuous power trace collected from
an app. PSC exploitation involves the following main steps.
4.2.1 Training Data Collection
The first step in collecting training data is selecting a tar-
get. The choice of the target depends on which kind of
PSC the attacker wants to exploit. For example, the load-
ing phase of a mobile app might be the target if the attacker
wants to leverage PSC # 1 described in Section 3.1. Or if
the attacker wants to leverage PSC # 2 as shown in Section
3.2, the loading of sensitive UIs are considered to be the
target.
After choosing the target, the attacker must specify the
start and end of the target explicitly so that its power pat-
tern can be precisely measured. As we have introduced in
Section 2.3, the voltage and current numbers of running the
target can be acquired by polling unprivileged system power
files and the power can be calculated based on them.
4.2.2 Model Training
Based on the collected power traces of the target, the at-
tacker needs to generate a signature to represent the target.
This step generally involves detecting features of the col-
lected power traces and and signatures accordingly. The
specific methods for detecting features abstracting the sig-
nature depend on the characteristics of the training dataset
and PSC exploitation scenario.
4.2.3 Target Detection
We assume that an attacking app runs in the background
on the smartphone, which continuously collect the power
traces. Based on the signature of the target trained in previ-
ous steps, the attacking app is able to detect the occurrence
of the target in real-time by running appropriate detection
algorithms. Detection algorithms are pattern matching al-
gorithms in essence and the choice of them depends on char-
acteristics of the PSC exploitation scenario.
5. DISCUSSIONS
This section discusses the limitations and countermea-
sures on the PSCs identified in the previous section.
Figure 5: An overview of a general PSC exploitation approach.
5.1 Limitations
Although we have demonstrated the existence of multiple
PSCs. There are some limitations in the current study, most
of which we plan to explore in future work:
• Identifying the side channel is only the first step. In
order to perform real-world attacks using these side
channels, there are various issues that should be con-
sidered, such as how to collect power patterns accu-
rately, how to detect app loading or sensitive UIs in
real-time, how to apply successful attacks in practical
scenarios, etc.
• One particular issue that needs to investigate is how
to guarantee that the power patterns keep unchanged
during real-time detection. For example, a pattern
matching app should be carefully implemented such
that it does not cause significant power overheads dur-
ing real-time detection. Otherwise it will difficult to
identify the power patterns due to power overhead of
the detecting process itself.
• In our experiments, we have only tested the ideal case
in which the background power consumption noise is
minimal. In reality, there might exist multiple apps
running in the background. Because these background
apps might make network or I/O requests in an ir-
regular way, it may affect the power patterns when we
tried to detect the patterns revealed by the PSCs. This
issue may also increase the difficulty to exploit discov-
ered PSCs, nonetheless PSCs are practical threats on
mobile devices.
5.2 Possible Mitigating Techniques
• Energy obfuscation through code injection. One
straightforward mitigation approach is that we can in-
ject meaningless code into mobile apps, in order to
insert power bursts into its power pattern to make it
unpredictable. This can be achieved at the source-code
level during app development, or through instrumen-
tation to the bytecode for app binaries.
• Randomly changing display/color parameters.
One interesting feature for the OLED or AMOLED
displays used for smartphones is that it consumes dif-
ferent power when different color schemes are used [15].
Thus we can vary the displaying color and other pa-
rameters during the execution of apps we want to pro-
tect. This could also be achieved during app develop-
ment or through bytecode instrumentation [28].
• Raising the privilege needed to access power
files. Of course, we can always make the power infor-
mation privileged, such that not all apps could access
these data directly. As a matter of fact, mobile apps
probably do not need to read low-level power related
files containing raw voltage or current readings. The
only thing that most apps need to know is how much
battery is still remaining, which should not pose seri-
ous threats as a side channel.
6. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we introduce background knowledge on
power characteristics of Android smartphones and related
research work on side channel attacks, especially power side
channel attacks.
6.1 Power Characteristics of Android Smart-
phones
In this paper, we use Android smartphones as our study-
ing subject as Android is currently the most popular mobile
operating system for smartphones and tablets. Similar al-
gorithms could be applied on Android tablets, as they share
the same framework and most of the APIs.
For a different mobile OS such as Apple iOS, the power
consumption patterns of their mobile apps share very similar
characteristics as Android because they use similar hardware
components and similar app structure. Thus the attacks
could potentially be repeated on iPhones as well.
Most smartphones are power-hungry devices, while many
batteries could last only less than a day in typical usage.
The most power consuming components are CPU, network,
screen and various sensors such as GPS and camera [10]. For
most Android smartphones, the screen consumes a major-
ity of the total power. The screen power could be affected
significantly due to its brightness and color of pixels [15],
thus it is able to reduce the power consumption of an app
by adjusting its color schemes [27].
For a mobile application, the power of a particular execu-
tion trace in a certain stable environment is determined by
the behavior of the app. Different types of apps consume
different power according to their usage of CPU cycles, net-
work traffic and screen brightness, etc. Power consumption
for an app can therefore be modeled by their resource us-
ages [51], system call traces [50] and source code [17], etc.
Besides power consumed when an app runs in the fore-
ground (i.e., with user interaction), many apps also consume
significant power when their respective services run in the
background, for example, checking new emails or new tweets
regularly. Although background power could potential drain
a lot of battery in the long run, it is relative small compared
to the power consumed by foreground apps. In this paper,
we only consider the power patterns of an app when it runs
in the foreground.
6.2 Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks have drawn researchers’ attention for
decades. Wright and Greengrass [48] reported the first offi-
cial record on utilizing side channel attacks that happened
in 1965. At first, research on side channel attacks mainly
focused on cryptography [25, 4, 23] and encrypted commu-
nications [42, 8, 40, 47]. In these study, side channel attacks
are defined as successfully decrypting the ciphertext based
on the information gathered from the encryption system that
is neither the plain-text being encrypted nor the cipher-text
after encryption.
Along with the research development, side channel attacks
are discussed more broadly in many contexts, not necessarily
limited to the contexts of cryptography and encrypted com-
munications. Previously discovered common side channels
include timing channels [46, 16, 9, 5, 13, 26, 54], acous-
tic channels [57, 14], electromagnetic waves [3, 44], shared
memory/registers/files between processes [38, 20, 55, 53],
sensor metrics [49, 35, 43, 41] and power consumption [24,
34]. Types of information can be leaked via these side chan-
nels include almost anything related to sensitive informa-
tion about users, such as keystrokes [21], locations [34],
speech [33] or even health data [13].
In order to protect computing systems from side-channel
attacks, many research work have proposed various mitiga-
tion or protection methods. Examples include redesigning
the encryption methods to prevent power analysis [36, 7],
predictive mitigation of timing channels for interactive ap-
plications [52], system-level protection against cache-based
side channel attacks [22], and new cache designs to thwart
software cache-based side channel attacks [45].
6.3 Power Side Channels
Power analysis attacks (or power side channels) [6] have
become an important type of side channel attacks in re-
cent years. One well-known example of power analysis is
the recovery of an encryption key from a cryptosystem [24,
23]. Messerges et al. [32, 31] examined both simple power
analysis(SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA) attacks
against the data encryption standard (DES) algorithm and
managed to breach the security of smart-cards using the pro-
posed signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) based multi-bit attack.[30]
In order to defeat power analysis attacks on smart-cards,
Herbst et al. [18] present an efficient AES software imple-
mentation that is suited for 8-bit smart-cards and resistant
against power analysis attacks. Ratanpal et al. [39] presents
a circuit that can be added to crypto-hardware to suppress
information leakage through the power supply pin side chan-
nel.
Chari et al. [11] propose a sound approach to counter-
act power analysis attacks. It includes an abstract model
which approximates power consumption in most devices and
a generic technique to create provably resistant implemen-
tations for devices where the power model has reasonable
properties. They prove a lower bound on the number of ex-
periments required to mount statistical attacks on devices
whose physical characteristics satisfy reasonable properties.
Power side channels have also been discovered on other
systems besides smart-cards. For example, Hlavacs et al. [19]
demonstrate that energy consumption side-channel attack
can be performed between virtual machines in a cloud.
On mobile platforms, Michalevsky et al. proposed Pow-
erSpy [34], which investigates the relation between signal
strength and the power pattern of the smartphone and showed
that they can infer smartphone users’ whereabouts based on
the power traces.
Our work also focuses on the mobile platform, but we have
presented different and more general exploitations based on
power traces.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have demonstrated the existence of var-
ious power side channels that can be exploited to perform
attacks to steal private information about apps running on
mobile devices.
We first provide our discovery of several power side chan-
nels on mobile devices. Then we provide a general exploita-
tion approach of these power side channels.
We believe these power side channels pose real threats
to mobile user security and privacy if they are exploited in
real-world attacks, thus needed to be addressed in an urgent
manner.
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